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The Right to Accrued Cumulative
Preferred Dividends
INTRODUCTION
One writer stated over twenty years ago that "few branches
of corporation law are in a more confused and unsatisfactory state
than that relating to the right of minority stockholders to prevent
amendments to the corporate charter, to which they have not given
their assent, from being operative."' Unfortunately, the statement
is still apropos today.
An Ohio corporation lawyer recently remarked that Ohio law
was in such an uncertain condition that he suggests the capital-
ization of new corporations, which he represents, make no pro-
vision for preferred stock. This type of action makes a discussion
of the general situation a timely one.
The historical and background material will be taken up in the
following subdivisions:
1. impairment of contracts,
2. reserved power,
3. restrictions on reserved power,
4. illusory concept of "vested rights,"
5. "good faith" and "fairness" tests,
6. effect of policy;
and then a survey of Ohio law will conclude the article.
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS
The Constitution of the United States declares that "no state
shall . . . pass any Law impairing the obligation of Contracts.12
The guiding light for construction of this clause is, and has been
for 130 years, Trustees of Dartmoutk College v. Woodward, where
it was held that when the legislature of a state grants a charter
to a private corporation, the charter involves a contract between
the state and the corporation. Marshall, C.J., stated in his opinion :3
It is more than possible, that the preservation of rights
of this description was not particularly in the view of the
framers of the Constitution, when the clause under consid-
eration was introduced into that instrument. It is probable,
that interferences of more frequent occurrence, to which
the temptation was stronger, and of which the mischief was
'Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters,
75 U. or PA. L. REv. 585 (1927).
2ART. I, §10.
14 Wheat. 518, 643 (U.S. 1819).
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more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing
this restriction on the state legislatures. But although a par-
ticular and a rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient
magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by the
rule, when established, unless some plain and strong reason
for excluding it can be given.
Since this well articulated opinion, no court has questioned the
application of the contract clause to corporate charters, except as
affected by the reserved power.
A similar provision appears in the Constitution of the State
of Ohio which declares: "the General Assembly shall have no
power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the obligation
of contracts; . . ."4
It has been said that a corporation charter is, in addition to a
contract between the state and the corporation, 5 also, a contract
between the corporation and the stockholders, and one between the
stockholders themselves.8 The Ohio courts have adopted the rela-
tionship between the corporation and the stockholders, and, as other
courts have done, refined the concept to include stock certificates.7
Needless to say, the stock certificate merely reiterates what is al-
ready defined in the corporate charter. This contract relationship is
a complex one and nice problems have arisen therefrom as to how
far the majority and/or management can coerce dissenting mi-
nority stockholders to submit to changes in their rights and lia-
bilities under this contract.8
RESERVED POWER
Story, J., stated in the Dartmouth College case :9
When a private eleemosynary corporation is thus created,
by the charter of the crown, it is subject to no other control
on the part of the crown, than what is expressly or implicitly
reserved by the charter itself. Unless a power be reserved
for this purpose, the crown cannot, in virtue of its preroga-
tive, without the consent of the corporation, alter or amend
the charter, or divest the corporation of any of its franchises,
or add to them, or add to, or diminish, the number of trus-
tees, or remove any of the members, or change or control
4 ART. II, §28.
Note 3, supra; 2 MORAW.Tz, CORPORATIONS §§1045, 1050, 1054, 1062 (2d
ed. 1886).
'Morris v. Amer. Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923);
Graeser v. Phoenix Finance Co., 218 Iowa 112, 254 N.W. 859 (1934); 2
MORAWETZ, CORPORATIONS §§1047, 1059, 1064 (2d ed. 1886); 1 FLETCHER,
CORPORATIONS §164 (1931); 13 Am. Jur., CORP., §§73, 76, 77 (1938).
"Geiger v. Seeding Mach. Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931);
Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 14 Ohio Op. 276, 22 N.E. 2d 281 (1939);
Knight v. Shutz, 141 Ohio St. 267, 47 N.E. 2d 886 (1943).
a BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §274 (1946).
'4 Wheat. 518, 674 (U.S. 1819).
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the administration of the charity, or compel the corporation
to receive a new charter.
It was not long after this until almost all the states had made
provision for the reserved power either by inserting changes into
their constitutions or by passing an appropriate statute. The Con-
stitution of the State of Ohio declares, "Corporations may be formed
under general laws; but all such laws may, from time to time, be
altered or repealed."'10 The general incorporation laws now en-
acted in almost all the states contain such a reservation to make
clear the retention of legislative control over corporations.- In
1927, when Ohio adopted a corporation act, Section 8623-14, Ohio
General Code, declared:
A corporation for profit organized under the provisions
of this act or of any previous corporation act of this state
may alter or add to its articles or change issued shares in any
respect by the adoption of an amendment in the manner here-
inafter provided in this act; ...
In a state, such as Ohio, in which existing corporations are subject
to the reserved power to amend, a new statute or even a compre-
hensive new corporation code may be made to apply to all those
corporations then existing as well as to those thereafter to be
formed.' 2
RESTRICTIONS ON RESERVED POWER
The power reserved to the legislature to alter or amend the
corporate charter is not without limitations or restrictions. How-
ever, the limits do not seem capable of any precise or intelligible
definition.": The reservation does not permit the legislature to
deprive a corporation, or its stockholders, or its creditors of rights
of contract or property without due process of law.14 Corpora-
tions and stockholders are entitled to protection of their "vested
rights" under the due process and equal protection clauses, and to
other rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutions.
The reserved power is held to enter into and form an integral
part of the "charter contract" of any corporation formed subse-
quent to the reservation-constitutional or legislative. The more
"ART. XIII §2.
" But see as to Louisiona, 3 LA. L. REV. 481 (1941), 9 TUANE L. Rnv. 292
(1934).
" OHIO GEN. CODE §§130, 135 (1946); 131 A.L.R. 725, 734; 1 DAVIES, OHIO
CORPORATION LAws 1152, 1160 (1942), 4 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 129, 150 (1930).
"Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1935); 75 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 585, 729, 737 (1927), 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§3679-3688 (1931).
" Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. Superior, 263 U.S. 125, 137 (1923);
In re Mt. Sinai Hospital, 250 N.Y. 103, 164 N.E. 871 (1929); 7 FLETCHFER,
CoRPoRATIONs §§3681, 3688 (1931).
"57 HARV. L. REV. 852, 872, 890 (1944); 31 COL. L. REv. 1163 (1931); 13
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 372 (1945).
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widely accepted, but not necessarily better, view extends to: (1)
the power to make mandatory changes by amendment of the cor-
poration laws, and, (2), to permissive changes authorized to be
made by a specific majority of the stockholders in accordance with
a statute enacted after the formation of the corporation, and after
the contract between the corporation and its stockholders was made,
even if a particular class of shares must suffer to a material
extent." In a few states, such as Utah and Idaho, a strict view
reserves the power to the state to make changes only in the public
interest and does not authorize permissive amendments changing
the contract rights of the stockholders among themselves.T Had
Ohio and other jurisdictions adopted this interpretation at the be-
ginning, the litigation would have been reduced considerably, but
this same litigation makes it, for all intents and purposes, im-
possible to revert to that point.
ILLUSORY CONCEPT OF "VESTED RIGHTS"
Once a court decides a certain contractual right is a "vested
right," then the legislature in the exercise of its reserved power
cannot authorize changes by amendment.18
Some of the rights which frequently have been supposed to be
vested 9 and so to be immune from the power of amendment are
the following: (1), the right to arrears of accrued dividends on
cumulative preferred shares; (2), the right to vote for the election
of directors; (3), the right to have stock remain noncallable; (4),
compulsory redemption rights to resell shares at the option of the
holder; (5), pre-emptive rights to subscribe for new issues of
shares; and (6), sinking fund provisions for the accumulation of
a fund for the retirement of preferred stock.20-
Voting rights are generally no longer within the realm of sanc-
tity.2' Thus, a majority of the stockholders may be authorized to
16 Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900) ; Goldman v. Postal Tel. Inc., 52
F. Supp. 763 (Del. 1943); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157,
142 Atl. 624 (1928).
3-7 Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907) ; Frost &
Co. v. Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 60 Id. 491, 92 P. 2d 1057, 1061, 1063 (1939);
32 MicH. L. Rnv. 743, 771, 772 (1934).
8Wheatley v. Root, 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946); Lonsdale
Securities Corp. v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50
(1927); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E. 2d 363 (1943);
31 CoL L. REv. 1163, 1168 (1931); 44 MIcH. L. REV. 659 (1945); FLErcHEm,
CORPORATIONS §§3696, 3697 (1931).
"The list is n~t necessarily to be considered complete in all jurisdications
today but is merely descriptive.
21 BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §277 (1946).
2Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909);
Lowenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 Atl. 454 (1894).
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restrict, create, or endanger the voting rights of certain classes of
stockholders. 2 Amendments changing the name or place of busi-
ness of a corporation have invariably been sustained.2 3 There is
a diversity of opinion as to whether a sale of all the assets can
be authorized by an amendment of the charter under the reserved
power.2 4
Almost all courts are in accord on the proposition that a holder
of stock, upon which a cumulative dividend has accrued and which
remains unpaid, has a vested interest or present property right,
which may not be extinguished by amendment, in an existing sur-
plus which might be lawfully applied to the payment of such
accrual to the extent of the arrears upon his stock.2 5
The court in Roberts v. Roberts-Wickes Co. 2 6 made one of the
first pronouncements on this subject when it stated:
The stock corporation law . . . authorized the reduction
to be made; but that statute and the proceedings under it
could not affect any vested right nor impair the force of any
corporate obligation. Nor was it intended to accomplish any
such thing; or anything more than to authorize the holders
of a majority of the stock, when the circumstances seemed
to them to justify it, to increase, or to reduce, the amount of
the capital stock. . . . Its agTeement to pay dividends on the
preferred stock had not been fulfilled, and, so long as the
corporation was a going concern, this default created an in-
debtedness, which was payable whenever, in the future, it
should accumulate surplus profits from the conduct of the
business. The preferred stockholder, as the result of the re-
duction of the capital stock, would hold a less number of
shares; but they would still be creditors for the arrears of
dividends due by the company on the shares of preferred
stock, which they had previously held. They may not have
] Morris v. Amer. Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122, Atl. 696 (1923);
Topkis v. Del. Hardware Co., 23 Del. Ch. 125, 2 A. 2d 114 (1938); 54 HARv. L.
REv. 1368, 1372 (1941).
'Clark v. Monongahela Nay. Co., 10 Watts 364 (Pa. 1840); Phinney v.
Trustees, 88 id. 633, 42 Atl. 58 (1898); Buffalo & N.Y.C.R.R. v. Dudley, 14
N.Y. 336 (1856); Park v. Modern Woodmen of Amer., 181 Ill. 214, 54 N.E.
932 (1899) ; Bryan v. Board of Educ., 151 U.S. 639 (1894).
"Invalid: Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1887) ; Allen v.
Francisco Sugar Co., 92 N.J. Eq. 431, 112 Atl. 887 (1921). Valid: Story v.
Road Co., 16 N.J. Eq. 13 (1863); Elec. Lighting Co. v. Sabre, 50 R.I. 288, 146
Atl. 777 (1929).
Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946);
Schaffner v. Standard Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454 (1948); Morris
v. Amer. Pub. Util. Co. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923); Gen'l Inv. Co. v.
Amer. Hide & Leather Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 214, 127 Atl. 529 (1925), aff'd 98 N.J.
Eq. 326, 129 Atl. 244 (1925) ; Lonsdale Sec. Co. v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Co.,
101 N.J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50 (1927) ; Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,
34 F. 2d 533 (R.I. 1929). Contra: Thomas v. Laconia Car Co., 251 Mass. 529,
146 N.E. 775 (1925).
-184 N.Y. 257, 264, 77 N.E. 13, 15 (1906).
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been creditors of the corporation in a technical sense; but,
as between themselves and other stockholders, they were as
creditors, with demands to be fully paid certain arrears of
dividends before any of the surplus profits should be appro-
priated to a dividend upon the common stock. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The effect of the Roberts case has been substantially removed in
New York,27 but its effect has been noted in other jurisdictions.
In Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp.,28 the federal court con-
strued the Delaware law as authorizing the removal of accrued
dividends by majority vote of the stockholders; in Keller v. Wilson
& Co. 29 the Delaware court of last resort subsequently held that
that construction was erroneous and refused to follow it. The
Keller case3 is probably the most widely cited case for the proposi-
tion that accrued dividends are a "vested right." The court ex-
pressed itself in this language:
The right of a holder of cumulative preferred stock,
issued at a time when the law did not permit of the cancella-
tion of accrued and unpaid dividends against the consent of
the holder, to such dividends, is, and ought to be regarded as
a substantial right. . . . If, . . . , that the right to have
paid at some future time the accumulation of dividends on
preferred stock, was, as between the shareholders, a fixed
and vested right, having the nature and character of a debt,
postponable in enjoyment until the creation of a fund from
which payment legally could be made, it is difficult to per-
ceive the justice of permitting the corporation to destroy the
opportunity to create the fund by action under a subsequent
amendment to the law which, when the corporation was
formed and the stock issued, did not permit of such destruc-
tion. (Emphasis supplied.)
In several states, including Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and
Virginia, specific statutory provisions have been adopted giving
every corporation the broad power to eliminate the claim to ac-
crued cumulative dividends by charter amendment or at least to
refund or satisfy it by exchange of shares or otherwise.2 ' Con-
stitutionality of such statutes, and specifically that of Ohio, will be
discussed infra.
One of the first cases sanctioning the elimination or subordina-
tion of accrued preferred dividends seems to be Johnson v. Bradley
Knitting Co.2 Other inroads have been made on the "vested rights"
"In re Duer, 270 N.Y. 343, 1 N.E. 2d 457 (1936).
65 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933).
21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 AtI. 115 (1936).
"Supre, note 29, 190 At. at 124.
"OHIo GEN. COD §8623-14(3) (i) (1938); STOCK CORP. LAW (N.Y.) §36E
(b) (1943); 1 N.J. RFv. STAT. §14-11-1 (1937); VA. CODE ANN. §3780 (1942).
1228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938).
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theory of limitations on charter amendments.3 One view is that
any preferential right may constitutionally be eliminated if a
statute permits it24 That the constitutional protection of vested
rights in dividends is not altogether outmoded is shown by the most
recent Ohio cases.:3
When dealing with a merger, the Delaware decisions have
reached an altogether different result. The court in Federal United
Corp. v. Havender- upheld a merger with its resulting cancellation
of accrued dividends, distinguishing the Keller3 7 case on its facts.
The vested rights doctrine in this situation was expressly repudi-
ated in Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp.38 Approval of this
merger with a subsidiary, created solely for the purpose, is going
to the verge of the law.
"GOOD FAITH" AND "FAIRNESS" TESTS
In those jurisdictions that have expressly repudiated the "vested
rights" theory, certain equitable limitations have been placed upon
charter amendments. Except in New Jersey, the courts have not
generally reviewed the "fairness" of amendments even in case of
substantial prejudice, short of fraud. The others have adopted the
position that the discretionary power of the controlling or specified
majority is untrammeled by any restriction other than the duty of
exercising good faith.30
The dictum in the McNulty case40 that the power of a court of
equity would be limited to a "test of good faith," which is the same
test that has been applied to justify non-interference by the courts
in the Delaware cases, indicates that the preferred stockholder
probably cannot look for a judicial requirement of objective fair-
ness to protect him under these statutes. This conclusion is sup-
' Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 135 F. 2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Goldman v. Postal Tel. Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (Del. 1943); Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 204 (Del. 1943); BERLE & MEANS, MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 217 (1932); 1 DAviEs, OHIo CORPORATION
LAW 323, 324 (1942).
'Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940);
McNulty v. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253, 260-262 (1945).
"'Wheatley v. Root, 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946) ; Schaffner v.
Std. Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454 (1948).
'24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940).
- 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936).
135 F. 2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
'Barrett v. Denver Tram. Co., 53 F. Supp. 198 (Del. 1943) ; McNulty v.
Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253 (1945); for an administrative opinion
see Report S.E.C., Reorganization Committee, Part VII, 519-525 (1938).
,o Supra, note 39.
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ported by Anderson v. Int'l Minerals & Chemicals Corp.,41 where
the court states:
If, proceeding in accordance with the statute, the con-
solidation is duly consummated, there are but two alterna-
tive rights which survive to the holders of the old shares:
to take the new shares upon the terms and conditions of
consolidation or to take the value of the old shares deter-
mined in accordance with Section 21 (the appraisal section).
(Emphasis supplied.)
In New Jersey, by contrast with Delaware and New York, an
analysis and synthesis of the cases will show equitableness plays
a real part in determining the validity of such amendments. The
"test of fairness" would appear to be primarily whether the cor-
poration had an earned surplus at the time of proposing abolition
of arrearages.4 2
While Ohio courts are apparently willing to stand or fall with
the "vested rights" theory, there are intimations in some of the
cases that other equitable limitations could be used. The syllabus
of Johnson v. Lamprecht4' states:
3. When there is a change in the terms and conditions
of stock by reason of an amendment to the articles of incor-
poration, dissenting shareholders have a remedy under the
provisions of §8623-72. If fraud or illegality is found in the
enactment of the amendment, the remedy under that section
is not exclusive.
and in Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Struble"4 the syllabus reads:
4. In the absence of fraud, an optional plan of mutualiza-
tion of a domestic stock life insurance corporation will not be
enjoined at the suit of dissenting minority shareholders who
are remitted to their statutary right to obtain the fair cash
value of their shares.
EFFECT OF POLICY
Letts, J., in the Yoakam case45 succinctly states the effect of
"policy" on this phase of the law:
Special circumstances relating to corporate needs, expedi-
ency, the plaintiff appearing as a professional obstructionist,
a dominant public interest, all have played a part in creating
a seemingly hopeless confusion of the law.
"295 N.Y. 343, 350, 67 N.E. 2d 573, 576 (1946).
"Day v. U.S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 736, 126 AtL 302
(1924) ; Gen'l Inv. Co. v. Amer. Hide & Leather Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 214, 127 AUI.
529 (1925) ; Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 543, 138 Atl. 772
(1927) ; Lonsdale Sec. Co. v. Int'l Mer. Marine Co., 101 NJ. Eq. 554, 139 Atl.
50 (1927); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A. 2d 200
(1943). But see Clark v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C. 1, 12 S.E. 2d 682 (1941).
133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. 2d 127 (1938).
"82 Ohio App. 480, 81 N.E. 2d 622 (1948).
34 F. 2d 533, 546 (R.I. 1929).
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Another reason for the fame of the Keller case46 is its open recog-
nition of the part policy plays in such determinations, as shown by
this excerpt from the opinion:
It may be conceded, as a general proposition, that the
State, as a matter of public policy, is concerned in the wel-
fare of its corporate creatures to the end that they may have
reasonable powers wherewith to advance their interests by
permitting adequate financing. It may also be conceded that
there has been an increasing departure from the conception
which formerly prevailed when the right of individual veto
in matters of corporate government operated as a dangerous
obstruction to proper functioning. . . the State is con-
cerned also with the welfare of those who invest their
money, the very essence of generation, in corporate enter-
prises. Some measure of protection should be accorded them.
While many interrelations of the State, the corporation, and
the shareholders may be changed, there is a limit beyond
which the State may not go. Property rights may not be
destroyed; and when the nature and character of the right
of a holder of cumulative preferred stock, to unpaid divi-
dends, which have accrued thereon through passage of time,
is examined in a case where that right was accorded protec-
tion when the corporation was formed and the stock was
issued, a just public policy, which seeks the equal and impar-
tial protection of the interests of all, demands that the right
be regarded as a vested right of property secured against
destruction by the Federal and State Constitutions.
One writer has used "overriding public interest" in lieu of "pub-
lic policy." He then considers it as a "judicial criteria," which is a
"current limitation on governmental power to expropriate private
property." 47
OHIO LAW
"The Wheatley-Schaffner Dilemma'
In order that the reader will have a typical fact situation at
hand and as a point of departure for a review of the Ohio law in
this regard, the facts of the most recent case reaching the court
of last resort in Ohio will be stated.48 The plaintiffs sued to recover
from defendants the amount of dividends which had accumulated
on their preferred shares of stock and to enjoin defendant corpora-
tion from paying dividends to the holders of common shares until
all the unpaid cumulative dividends on the preferred shares shall
have been paid. It was alleged that the directors were attempting
to do what plaintiffs sought to enjoin. Plaintiffs' stock was cre-
"190 Atl. 115, 124 (1936).
1 For complete discussion see STRONG, MATERIALS ON AMERICAN CONSTITru-
TIONAL LAw, Part II, 321 (1949).
"Schaffner v. Std. Boiler & Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St. 454 (1948).
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ated December 26, 1928, and the pertinent part of the Articles of
Incorporation, as amended, provided:
Such dividends shall be cumulative from the first day of
January, 1929, and no dividends shall be declared on the
second preferred stock or the common stock on any year
(. .. ) until all such cumulative dividends on the first pre-
ferred stock for such year and all previous years have been
paid or declared and surplus appropriated to the extent
thereof.
On February 2, 1939, more than two-thirds of the stockholders ap-
proved a charter amendment, now being questioned, that provided
in part:
That the present issue of the first preferred and second
preferred stock shall be cancelled; that all indebtedness now
due and owing to the holders thereof by way of dividends
which have accrued and would in the future accrue to them
. . . is waived; . . .
The plaintiffs did not consent thereto and now question its
legality to affect their contracts. The defendants admitted the
then state of the law, as expressed in Wheatley v. A. L Root Co.; 49
but alleged it did not apply to these facts since defendant cor-
poration was insolvent and the defense of laches and estoppel
was applicable. Held, plaintiffs could not be deprived of their
accured dividends.
As stated supra the Ohio courts are still wedded to the "vested
rights" theory. Whether this is a "marriage of convenience" and
the extent to which it is actually believed will not be questioned
for the moment. However, it should be noted that the use of
"indebtedness" in the amendment, as done in the "Schaffner"
amendment, makes a "vested rights" result easier.
In order that the reader may better get the significance of forth-
coming observations, pertinent portions of the Wheatley and
Schaffner syllabi will be excerpted. Wheatley case syllabi include:
1. A provision giving preferential rights to the holders
of preferred shares in a private corporation incorporated in
their stock certificates and in the articles of incorporation,
constitutes a definite contractual undertaking between such
shareholders and the corporation and such rights are pro-
tected by the constitutional safeguards prohibiting retro-
active legislation or legislation impairing the obligation of
contracts.
2 . ..
3. The provisions of Section 8623-14(3) (i), General
Code, . . . may not be applied retroactively to permit an
alteration of the terms of a contract made by a private cor-
poration with its shareholders prior to the date of the enact-
ment of such statute.
4 .... Held: The plan of recapitalization adopted im-
,' 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
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pairs vested contractual rights of shareholders protected by
the Constitution of Ohio, which rights are thereby violated
by the retroactive application of Section 8623-14(3) (i),
General Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notice that the court in no place spells out just what "pref-
erential rights" are involved. At first blush, one thinks that under
the Ohio contract clause all contract rights are sanctified and the
reserved power under this same constitution (referred to in syl-
labus 2, which is omitted) is of no effect. As indicated by a perusal
of Ohio and other jurisdictions this is not true. Notice, also, that
the court does not state the date, up to which the corporation may
not divest the stockholders of their "vested rights." In view of the
fact that the court of appeals permitted recovery only up to July
24, 1939 (date of statutory change), it would seem that this was a
significant issue to be decided. Notice, also, no mention of the
general corporation act adopted in 1927, which was, so far as
Section 8623-14, Ohio General Code, is concerned, a legislative
delegation of the right to make amendments under the reserved
power, contained therein.
Two years later the Sclwffner case"0 was before the court. The
facts were comparable except that this amendment was made prior
to the 1939 amendment, not after as in the Wheatley case.1 This
appeared to be the ideal time to rectify the confusion of the latter
case, and to correctly state the law of Ohio in this regard. With
all due respect to the members of the Ohio Supreme Court, it ap-
pears that in their effort to relieve the confusion, the law became
further uncertain. The court very meticulously covered all the
points mentioned in the previous paragraph. As to the date to
which recovery is permitted, the court states, in syllabus 3:
but such plan is ineffective to cancel unpaid cumulative
dividends which had accrued prior to the date of the adoption
of the plan of recapitalization.52
It might be pertinent to mention at this juncture that in Ohio it
has been established, since the adoption of Rule 6 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court in 1858, that the syllabus of a supreme court
decision states the law. '3 However, it has been held that the rules
stated in the syllabus must be interpreted with reference to the
facts of the case and the questions presented to the court . . . 4
Does this justify reading into the end of the statement quoted from
' 150 Ohio St. 454 (1948).
' 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
' This phraseology seems to have been taken from Harbine v. Dayton Malle-
able Iron Co., 14 Ohio Op. 276, 22 N.E. 2d 281 (1939).
c 11 0. Jun., CouRTs, §§144, 145 (1930); Reporter's note, 94 Ohio St. ix,
116 N.E. xii (1916) .
I.Miller v. Eagle, 96 Ohio St. 106, 117 N.E. 23 (1917).
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the Schaffner syllabus "if before July 24, 1939, or if covering stock
purchased before July 24, 1939 ?"
Assume for the moment that the stock in question was pur-
chased in 1940 and the amendment date is 1943. Quaere: whether
the court meant the law to be that the accrued dividends from
1940 to 1943 represented a "vested right" but that the court would
not protect the stockholder after 1943. This may be an equitable ap-
proach but hardly seems appropriate in view of the fact that in
"syllabus 1" of the Schaffner case the court indicated that laws in
effect when the stock was issued became a part of the contract.
In any event it is not exactly clear what was meant and could give
rise to meritorious contentions.
In the light of the facts of the Wheatley case.'5 the court must
make in the future a close scrutiny of the surplus of the corpora-
tion at the time of amendment to protect the innocent dissenter
from the perpetration of a fraud.
Constitutionality of Section 8623-14(3) (i)
While the constitutionality of the prospective effect of this sec-
tion was not an issue in the Wheatley case.56 the court left the
question open by stating, "It should be observed that no question
relative to the prospective application of these statutes is presented,
and, therefore, is not considered or decided."
The section of the Code, in question, states a corporation by
adoption of an amendment may:
i. change any or all of the express terms and provisions
of designations of issued or unissued shares of any class or
series; which change, if desired, may include the discharge,
adjustment or elimination of rights to accrued undeclared
cumulative dividends on any such class; . . .
It has been said that the purpose of specification of particular
amendments is to avoid doubtful questions of construction which
have arisen under general powers of amendment.5 7 Prima facie
it is true that the powers given in such amending statutes are
absolute and unlimited. The courts are left without guidance. It
ought to be obvious, however, that the purpose of granting these
broad powers is to confer adequate authority for legitimate changes.
One writer thinks that it can hardly have been the purpose con-
templated by the legislators that a majority vote may arbitrarily
and capriciously reduce or take away the stipulated rights of pre-
ferred shares as against a dissenting minority merely for the
' 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
'Supra, note 55.
"Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938);
Breslav v. N.Y. & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291
N.Y.S. 932 (1936), 'ffd 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E. 2d 708 (1937); 7 FLtCcHER,
CORPORATiONS §3718 (1931).
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benefit of the common shares. If the statutes, such as the one in
Ohio, are to be construed as conferring such arbitrary power, they
might well be held to be unconstitutional.58
A careful reading of the section in question reveals no mention
of the "lack of surplus" as a prerequisite for such an amendment.
Assuming for the moment that Ohio courts abandon the "vested
rights" theory when faced with the issue of the prospective effect
of the section, the mere fact that a corporation with an abundant
surplus could destroy the accrued dividends by amendment there-
under would amount to such an arbitrary, capricious, and even
fraudulent abuse of the reserved power, that the section should be
stricken down as violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Present Redemies to the Dissenter
First, he may accept whatever is offered to him in the reorgan-
ization as satisfaction of his accrued dividends and other pref-
erential rights that may be sacrificed, for the "good of the
corporation."
Second, he may resort to the privilege to withdraw with the
appraised value of his stock, as provided in Ohio General Code,
Section 8623-72 (1938).
Finally, assuming stock issued after 1939, he may test the con-
stitutionality of sub-section 14(3) (i) in the state courts. This is
dangerous because if the Supreme Court finds the statute constitu-
tional only on state grounds, as was done regarding another statute
in Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton,9 the United States Su-
preme Court mnay be precluded from ever taking jurisdiction.
Consolidation Cases
In a recent case in an inferior court, 0 the court reached a result
which overthrows the "vested rights" doctrine in consolidation
cases. While the Havender6 ' and Hottenstein2 cases were dis-
tinguished upon the facts, the result is the same. Special han-
dling of these cases seems odd in the light of Ohio's long adoption
of the "vested rights" doctrine. No doubt this problem will be
scrutinized closely if and when it is carried to higher courts of
Ohio.
CONCLUSION
Although the majority stockholders do not have the benefit of
the reserved power, as in Ohio, to remove accrued dividends on
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS, §278 (1946).
138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E. 2d 70 (1941).
Anderson v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 54 Ohio Abs. 65 (Ohio C. P. 1948).
24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940).
135 F. 2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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cumulative preferred stock, they can, by the use of prior issues of
stock and by reducing future rights of the old stock, exert such
pressure as to compel the dissenter to exchange and release his
accrued dividends "voluntarily." "The apple that cannot be picked
can, nevertheless, be shaken down."6 3 The use of pressure has been
effectively prohibited in some cases.6 1
As his defense against oppression, the dissenter has usually
relied upon such concepts as constitutional protection of vested
rights, as we have in Ohio, or lack of corporate power, and where
these have failed him-either because of judicial decisions or legis-
lation-he has been left almost entirely unprotected, as the Hotten-
stein and Barrett cases6 5 demonstrate.
If a requirement of fairness were to be acknowledged, what
would be the test of an equitable reorganization? The most reason-
able tests probably are: (1), corporate necessity for the amend-
ment, and (2), the substantial equivalence between what the pre-
ferred stockholder gives up and what he receives.6 Such necessity
will be a matter of proof to be offered to a court or administrative
body depending on the procedures established by an appropriate
statute.
David W. Hart
'Becht, The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends, 40 COL. L. Riv. 633
(1940).
1 Lonsdale Sec. Co. v. Int'l Merc. Marine Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 50
(1927) ; Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
1 Hottenstein case, 135 F. 2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Barrett case, 53 F.
Supp. 198 (Del. 1943).
"Latty, Fairness-The FocaZ Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimina-
tion, 29 VA. L. RnV. 1 (1942); Becht, supra, note 64. But see Dodd, Fair and
Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HAnv. L. RBv. 780 (1942).
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